Feelings in Literature by Johansen, Jørgen Dines
REGULAR ARTICLE
Feelings in Literature
Jørgen Dines Johansen
Published online: 17 February 2010
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this article it is argued that feelings are all important to the function of
literature. In contradiction to music that is concerned with the inwardness of
humankind, literature has, because of language, the capacity to create fictional
worlds that in many respects are similar to and related to the life world within which
we live. One of the most important reasons for our emotional engagement in
literature is our empathy with others and our constant imagining and hypothesizing
on possible developments in our interactions with them. Hence, we understand and
engage ourselves in fictional worlds. It is further claimed and exemplified, how
poetic texts are very good at rhetorically engage and manipulate our feelings.
Finally, with reference to the important work of Ellen Dissanayake, it is pointed out
that the first kind of communication in which we engage, that between mother and
infant, is a kind of speech that positively engages the infant in a dialogue with the
mother by means of poetic devices.
Keywords Feelings.Literature.Music.Mimesis .Inwardness.Evolution.
Semiotics.Communication.Empathy.Prediction.Hypothesis-making.Imagination
The study of the relationship between feelings and literature is, at the moment,
popular and blooming.
1 The interest in this subject, it seems to me, is justified by the
fact that literary discourse itself is designed to arousing and forming the feelings of
the listeners and readers.
Let us, however, start out by briefly inquiring into C.S. Peirce’s ideas about
feelings. It is well known that Peirce has many distinctions between kinds of
interpretants. Here, however, I will only mention two divisions that between the
immediate, the dynamical, and the final interpretant, and that between the emotional,
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attempt to point out the differences between these two classifications, they are very
close, but they point to and stress different aspects of the process of interpretation.
The second classification, the one between the emotional, the energetic, and the
logical interpretant, highlights different kinds of mental processes. Peirce’s definition
of the emotional interpretant runs as follows:
The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is
almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we
comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in
this is frequently very slight. This “emotional interpretant,” as I call it, may
amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is
the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, the performance
of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey,
the composer’s musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of
feelings. If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so
through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will
always involve an effort. (“Pragmatism”, CP 5.475, 1907)
I am not going into the distinction between immediate, dynamical, and final
interpretant and that of the emotional, energetic, and logical, they are close to each
other, but while the first distinction is closely related to his categories, the second is,
in addition to this, also describing some aspects of mental processes. Interesting is,
in my opinion, Peirce’s exemplification: A performance of a piece of music is seen
as a sign, and its object is, according to Peirce, the musical ideas of its composer,
and, Peirce says, “usually they consist merely in a series of feelings.” I am not going
to directly discuss whether Peirce commits what the new critics called an intentional
fallacy, although many scholars would deny the importance of the reference to the
originator of the music.
2
What interests me here is the coupling of a string of sounds structurally related to
each other with feelings. Whereas linguistic utterances (including literature, see
below) in addition to phonetic and syntactic structures have a semantic one as well,
this does not seem to be the case with regard to music. Unless, of course if one
would claim that there exists a kind of proto-semantics in music because its material
and structural properties are encoding the feelings of the composer, as Peirce claims,
and, may be more importantly, call forth a series of feelings in the audience.
Obviously, there are very many difficulties with regard to this point of view. It seems
to me, however, that this position reveals something important, because without
some version of it, it seems, at least to me, hard to account for the doubtlessly strong
emotional effect that music exercises on people. In music, we have a semiotic that
lacks reference to the external world; I think program music is negligible. However,
music does not lack reference, its reference, however, is the feelings that it calls forth
in the listeners; its main reference is, in short, is to an inner, mental world that seems,
2 The intentional fallacy was named so in the article by William K. Wimsatt, and Monroe C. Beardsley
“The Intentional Fallacy.” Sewanee Review, vol. 54 (1946): 468–488. Revised and republished in The
Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, University of Kentucky Press, 1954:3 –18. It should be
noticed that, although it is still common to subscribe to this view, it certainly has its own difficulties.
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musical taste is certainly not uniform across different segments of society.
The great Hungarian literary scholar, aesthetician, and philosopher, Georg
Lukàcs, believed that music is certainly mimetic, but mimetic in the second degree.
He writes:
Our point of departure is the point of view, already prevailing in Greek
antiquity, that the object of musical mimesis, the object imitated by music
[musikalische Wiederspielung] is human inwardness [Innerlichkeit], human
emotional life. […] Immediately and originally, however, such inwardness is as
a—relatively—independent sphere not present at all. It is a product of societal-
historical development of humankind. We will be able to see that its formation
[Gestaltwerden] and unfolding shows a precise parallelism with the come into
being and bloom of music as an independent art form. (Lukács 1963: II, 339,
my translation from German)
Hence, music imitates feelings that arise through our interaction with others in the
lifeworld. However, music does not represent this interaction itself neither our
common lifeworld, it only represents its emotional output in the individual psyche.
Lukàcs further claims that music has two primary sources, song and rhythm
connected to communal work and magical evocation. In the development of the
human species, he claims that music largely loses its close relation to magic and
becomes a primarily aesthetic phenomenon, which is, however, still firmly related to
and expressing human feelings.
One could add that the communal struggle for survival, over evolutionary time,
changes the mental capacities of humankind and among these the basic emotions,
although there is no agreement on what they are.
3 The growing independence—over
time—of man’s inner world from the interactions within the common lifeworld, is
certainly relative, not absolute. With regard to music, it means, however, that it
awakes feelings, even if they are not warranted by real lifeworld situations. Thus, the
enjoyment music offers and its obviously strong impact on the feelings of the
listeners are partly due to its making possible to experience feelings change, with
regard to mode and strength, according to the development of the given piece of
music. Music, then, becomes, among other things, a means of getting excited about
and enjoying one owns feelings without worrying about what has caused them.
The Linguistic Utterance
A linguistic utterance is in itself a result of a complex process, because it
simultaneously fulfills several functions, and thus it blends, as it were, several
structuring principles on line. First of all, it is formed according to the language
system in question, although it may of course offend against aspects of its
grammaticality. However, in addition to its linguistic structures, utterances and texts
3 Ekman et. al. is close to Darwin in giving the following list of six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear,
joy, sadness, surprise, whereas Panksepp’s list is shorter: expectancy, fear, rage, panic. On both lists,
however, only one positive emotion is listed, but they have all survival value.
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protest against, the conventions of the discourse and genre to which they belong.
Obviously, literary discourse is not the only kind of discourse designed to arouse the
feelings of an audience. The uses and history of rhetoric show that working on the
pathos of an audience was considered one of the most important ways of ensuring its
acceptance and consequently that it prevailed.
Furthermore, classical rhetoric was traditionally divided into three branches,
forensic speech devoted to establish what has happened and whether somebody is
guilty or not. Deliberative speech is directed towards the future. In order to ensure
the happiness of the people, or avoid unhappiness, it suggests and argues in favor of
a specific course of action, i.e. it recommends some solutions to political problems
rather than others. Finally, however, a third kind of speech was singled out, the
epideictic, that of praise or blame. It also had, and has, mainly practical purposes
such as obituary, official speeches, demonstration, and teaching. However, from a
more general point of view, epideictic speech is very important because it serves to
establish and confirm the values of the community.
4 Epideictic speech was, however,
primarily concerned with real living or deceased people (with the exception of its use
in teaching how to speak). Finally it should be mentioned that although rhetoric was
preoccupied with influencing what was going on in public affairs, it, nevertheless,
made use of fictions. They were used and considered useful in public speeches.
According to Aristotle:
Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that,
while it is difficult to find similar things that have really happened in the past,
it is easier to invent fables, for they must be invented, like comparisons, […]
(Aristotle 1926: 277, Rhet. 1394a)
Hence, what are fundamental characteristics of literature, the use of poetic devices
and fiction, are also present in persuasive speech, i.e., speech whose purpose is to
making the speaker’s points of view accepted by the audience by working on its
feelings as well as on its reasoning powers.
Overdetermined Texts
Linguistic texts are themselves always overdetermined; they are neither produced nor
interpreted by using principles belonging to a single system. Semiotics is, among other
things, the study of the interrelation of different systems in the production,
communication,andinterpretationofmeaning.Concretely, differentmodelsofsemiosis
andofcommunicationareattemptstohighlightandrelatethedifferentfactorsandforces
that determine the text. Famous is, for instance, the six functions model of Jakobson
(emotive, phatic, conative, referential, metalinguistic, and poetic.
5 In communicating
4 Even humble speeches at private birthday parties still fulfill this function, and obituaries, which were the
first kind of epideictic speech, in praising the achievements of the deceased, also still display and confirm
the values of the community.See Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:4 7 –54.
5 ) I have myself attempted to construct Peirce’s understanding of semiosis, in the so-called semiotic
pyramid, I do add, however, utterer and interpreter to his triadic conception of semiosis, in order to be able
to account for human communication. See, for instance Johansen 2002: 55.
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exhibiting ourselves, referring to or creating a world, and displaying the immanent
patterns of the semiotic, the language in question. Obviously, these four activities are
certainly not mutually exclusive. This polyfunctionality is, of course, inherited by
literature. Indeed, self-expression (of the utterer), creating a virtual world, and self-
representation (of textual patterning) are most often fused and collaborating to
heighten the expressiveness and aesthetic effect of the individual literary text,
although, from the point of view of analysis, they may be distinguished.
In its world-creating capacity the literary texts represent and describe the feelings
of characters and narrators. Since authors are creating narrators and characters and
what is happening to them, they are able to let readers know what these creatures of
their own minds, feel, and how they respond emotionally to what befalls them.
Indeed, narrators, in the last analysis authors, are even able to indirectly, by showing
the characters’ reactions, or directly by commenting on the characters able to
interpreting and explaining their emotional attitudes. In short a substantial part of the
mimetic dimension of literature is concerned with the representation of feelings.
Furthermore, in representing the feelings of fictional characters, the authors are
very often successful in eliciting an emotional response in the readers. Despite the
fact that readers very well know that what befalls the character in a novel, never
happened in the historical lifeworld, but only within a fictional world that is a
product of somebody’s fantasy (unless, of course, a historical character is included in
the text).
One reason for such a response is, I suppose, our predisposition for empathy, our
ability to feel and understand the emotional reactions of others, and to share them.
Indeed, what befalls a fictional character may trigger strong reactions within a
devoted readership. The case concerning the fate of the character of Little Nell in
Dickens’ The Old Curiosity Shop (1841) is well-known. Here a summery made by
David Cody for The Victorian Web may suffice:
When The Old Curiosity Shop was approaching its emotional climax—the death of
Little Nell—Dickenswas inundatedwithlettersimploringhim tospare her,andfelt,as
he said, “the anguish unspeakable,” but proceeded with the artistically necessary
event. Readers were desolated. The famous actor William Macready wrote in his diary
that “I have never read printed words that gave me so much pain. ...Icould not weep
for some time. Sensations, sufferings have returned to me, that are terrible to awaken.”
Daniel O’Connell, the great Irish member of Parliament, read the account of Nell’s
death while he was riding on a train, burst into tears, cried “He should not have killed
her,” and threw the novel out of the window in despair. Even Carlyle, who had not
previouslysuccumbedtoDickens’semotionalmanipulation,wasovercomewithgrief,
and crowds in New York awaited a vessel newly arriving from England with shouts of
“Is Little Nell dead?” (“Dickens’s Popularity”,The Victorian Web)
As the reaction to the fate of Little Nell should have made abundantly clear,
empathy is not only a response to real people, it is easily extended to creatures that are
creations of the minds of others, or of us. One reason for this is, I suppose, the role that
prediction and hypothesis-making play in our interaction with others. We constantly
hypothesize about how others will act in the immediate future. At least implicitly and
often explicitly, we say “because this is as things are, I expect so and so to happen.”
Using the imagination to predicting what is going to happen next is an invaluable
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future event in our lifeworld and the creation of fictional worlds are very close to each
other, and hence we respond easily with empathy to emotional charged situations and
events, even if they take place in an invented world.
However, the fact that what is represented never has happened and never will
happen, allows us to respond more freely and in different ways to literature, because
we may both have the feeling of becoming a part of its world, of participating in
what is happening, and, in the next split second, we may react as outsiders who need
not at all to be worried about, indeed not to care for what is happening. Oscar
Wilde’s reaction to the description of the death of Little Nell, whether serious or not,
is also an important part of the story about its impact. He said “that no one could
read the death-scene of Little Nell without dissolving into tears—of laughter.” (John
Cody: “Dickens’ Popularity”, The Victorian Web). Literature in general makes an
effort to engage us in what is important to it, and it is often successful (cf. the
emotional grip Dickens had on the majority of his contemporary readers).
Nevertheless, it cannot command our attention and that we care for it, and this is,
for two reasons, a substantial part of its attraction: First, most texts addressed to us
demand that we respond, and that we often do it quickly and in prescribed or at least
presupposed ways. Whether we are addressed by the authorities or by people close
to us, we are obliged to act. Hence, it is a relief that we need not do so with regard to
literature, and either in any prescribed way. Indeed, we may put a literary text away
without bothering to finish reading it. Second, precisely because we are at liberty not
to bother, the literary text must, if its author wants to be read, make up to us. Since it
cannot give us orders of command, it must have some kinds of attraction in store for us
such as: elaborated style, importance of subject, exiting or thrilling plot, and arousal of
feelings. Still, we remain in charge, and we may respond to literature in many and
complex ways and enjoy both its attempts to bind us to it and our basic liberty with
regard to it. This liberty, of course, is also in force with regard to the feelings described
in a literary text, we may at one moment follow the outlined path to the emotions it is
supposed to arouse, and in the next distance ourselves from them.
The Emotional Impact
Here I will, however, point to another dimension of the literary text, a dimension that
was briefly mentioned in the beginning with regard to music, namely the emotional
impact of its material and formal properties. What distinguishes literature from most
other kinds of discourse is the systematic surplus-coding of formal and material
features of the sign vehicle. The point is that this surplus-coding of the expression
has formative effects on the content and meaning of the literary text. I am well aware
that this point has been made before, in different ways both by the Russian
Formalists and by the New Critics. Indeed, the latter warned explicitly against the
heresy of paraphrase. Cleanth Brooks defines what such heresy offends against:
The essential structure of a poem (as distinguished from the rational or logical
structure of the ‘statement’ which we abstract from it) resembles that of
architecture or painting: it is a pattern of resolved stresses. Or, to move closer
still to poetry by considering the temporal arts, the structure of a poem
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and balances and harmonizations, developed through a temporal scheme.
(Brooks 1947: 203)
Brooks also compare a poem to a play in order to persuade us to see it as an
action rather than as a statement. Brooks does not deny, of course, that it is possible
to extract a statement from a poem, what he claims is rather that neither as structure
and action it can be reduced to it. Of course, he says both poetry and drama use
ideas, they are not “merely emotional.” On the contrary, what he claims, is that “[t]
he relationship between the intellectual and the non-intellectual in a poem is actually
far more intimate that the conventional accounts would represent it to be: the
relationship is not that of an idea “wrapped in emotion” or a prose-sense decorated
by sensuous imagery.” (204)
The intimate relationship between expression and content in poetry, and in
literature in general, is, I agree with Brooks, essential, and I will try to give an
example to show how effectively the poeticity of a text changes its whole purport.
This is my example:
What is it men in women do require?–
The lineaments of gratified desire.
What is it women do in men require?–
The lineaments of gratified desire.
(Blake 1971: 167)
Blake’s little poem is certainly a show case of poetic devices; all three kinds of
analogies, phonological, syntactic, and semantic and their interrelation catch and
please ear and mind. And thus it is exemplary of the self-representative capacity of
poetry, and of the force of analogy. At the same time, it is a poem about human
desires and emotions. In fact it not only states the reciprocity of desire, it represents,
even mimes it:
men : women :: women : men
This reciprocity is mimed by means of a varied repetition patterned by a
consideration for rhythm and euphony (e.g. the positioning of do in lines one and
three). Furthermore, the use of repetition is truly thematically significant, because it
stresses the universality and reciprocity of its propositional content. The interplay
between the poetic devices clearly serves the purpose of conjuring up a certain belief
and a certain emotional attitude. This becomes obvious, when we use the test of
paraphrase. In prose, the propositional content may be rendered: both men and
women require having proof of their ability to gratify each other’s erotic desire. This
general proposition might prove hard to substantiate, and it might call up objections
of different kinds. One might claim, for instance, that: people do not care for the
satisfaction of their partners, but only for their own. Or, it might be objected that
men and women do not understand and react to sexual desire in the same way, and
consequently, seeing their desire as identical (and reciprocal) is false. Obviously, we
might also respond to the poem in this way and come up with similar objections. Its
rhetorical force, however, makes such a response less likely. This strength is
achieved through the repetitions on the phonological, syntactical, and semantic
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poem is, like poems in general, a complex system that engenders emergent qualities,
because the material and formal aspects of the text enhance the plausibility and force
of the propositional content. Further, Blake’s poem seems to imitate a preliterary
genre that makes specific use of the question/answer-structure, namely the riddle.
To solve a riddle is to unveil a secret and, according to magical thinking, may
mean the acquisition of great, sometimes superhuman, power (cf. Oedipus solving
the riddle of the Sphinx). And solving a riddle is precisely what this poem pretends
to do. Thus what with regard to its propositional content seems to be an assertion of
a general state of affairs is, as regards its propositional attitude, a magical act, a
conjuration to the effect that men and women desire each other’s desire—as if
stating the answer as a fact would make it one. Thus, the poem forcefully expresses
an emotive attitude and a belief, namely the conviction that something, whose reality
would be vitally important to most people, is in fact the case. In doing so, the focus
has changed from what has been said about a (supposed) state of affairs in the world,
i.e., from the represented to the text as an utterance to which the utterer is committed
and of whose truth and significance he attempts to persuade his interlocutors.
Here we confront one of the perennial questions concerning literature, namely the
question of which kind of knowledge literature embodies. Is literature a kind of
knowledge sui generis, revealing states of affairs only accessible through it? Or is
the cognitive content of literature related to doxa, to that which is commonly thought
to be the case, or to that which ought to be the case? In my opinion literature is the
latter, not the former. Most often literature neither creates nor is it instrumental in
bringing about novel knowledge, be it theoretical, practical, historical, or technical.
However, literature is about something else that, in my opinion, is even more
important: it creates novel experiences, in the sense that it exemplifies ways in which
the subject, or rather subjects do, could or should relate to each other and to the
lifeworld. Knowledge is either knowing that something is, or is not, the case, or
knowing how to do something. Knowledge is oriented either towards states of affairs
or achievements. Experience, however, means counting in the subject, and
consequently, experience means being emotionally involved with and responding
to what confronts us. Further, experience is felt as synthetic and intuitive (although
unconsciously it may be interpretive and analytic). Obviously, it will often become
an object of reflection and interpretation (as here the experience of Blake’s poem),
but before that it is an event that occurs and matters to somebody.
Literature and Science
This is why it is questionable to claim that, for instance, literature and science are
two specific forms in which the same object is given. Maybe it is more correct and
fruitful to say that literature and science only on a very high level of abstraction can
be said to treat the same object. They seem rather each to focus on a separate pole in
the subject—object relationship. Experience, on my view, is related to the subject
pole and knowledge to the object pole. Thus, it seems to be true that what is
accessed through literature could not be accessed through science, it would disappear
by the way in which science would approach it.
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expresses everyday experience, except that it often is concentrated on peak moments
or crises and rites of passage, and except that it may put into language something
that would otherwise remain unsaid. Furthermore, the fact that it expresses common
experiences is its strength.
It has further been argued that there are two modes of cognitive functioning “each
providing distinctive ways of ordering experience.” They are thought to be
irreducible to one another, and operating according their own, different criteria of
well-formedness:
One mode, the paradigmatic or logico-scientific one, attempts to fulfill the
ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. It
employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations by which
categories are established, instantiated, idealized and related to one another to
form a system. […] At gross level, the logico-scientific mode (I shall call it
paradigmatic hereafter) deals in general causes, and their establishment, and
make use procedures to assure verifiable reference and to test for empirical
truth. Its language is regulated by requirements of consistency and noncontra-
diction.
[…]
[…] the narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama,
believable (though not necessarily “true”) historical account. It deals with
human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and con-
sequences that mark their course. (Bruner 1986:1 2 –13).
One might wish to qualify the claims of Bruner concerning certain points. For
instance, literature, including narrative, is also different from the paradigmatic mode
of thought by the double insistency, even obtrusiveness, of language within it. On
the one hand, language as material quality becomes palpable, to use Jakobson’s
expression, on the other, the polysemy of words and phrases is explored (in other
places Bruner recognizes this difference). Furthermore, literature certainly includes
and makes use of arguments. Nevertheless, it uses them primarily rhetorically: the
text is not created for the sake of the argument; the office of the argument is to
attribute to the global effect of the text. Finally, it should be stressed that Bruner’s
description of the modes are, as he says himself, “platonic,” it describes what the
paradigmatic and the narrative modes ideally, but also typically, do; thus leaving
room for their being mixed in concrete instances.
6
Blake’s poem illustrates the narrative-poetical, or mythical mode of thinking: like
most literature, it does not procure new knowledge. On the contrary, most grown-ups
know immediately what the matter is—and that it matters. And this is precisely the
point. The relevance and importance, of Blake’s poem lies in its integration of
common experience and subjective and emotional engagement (here conjuring is
supposed to bring about a wish-fulfillment) through the poetic expression. This is, as
shown above, a major reason for New Criticism’s idea that paraphrase is a heresy
6 Bruner’s distinction has been corroborated and developed by Merlin Donald who in the mental, and
cerebral, development of man, i.e., cognitive evolution, distinguishes between the mythic and the theoretic
culture, claiming that the mind of contemporary man is a hybrid and multi-layered (see Donald 1991).
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levels. Hence, paraphrase is a heresy, not because (partial) translation of poetic texts
is impossible—certainly it is not, but because the integrative nature of experiencing
literature disappears, and thus its significance.
Thus the surplus-coding of the literary text does, at least in an important sense,
call forth profound changes in the way it is experienced: That which outside
literature would be stated as a hypothesis is, within it, stated as a fact; that which
outside would be considered contingent, is inside it considered a necessity, and
within it “proof” is furnished by the material and formal properties of uttering, rather
than by the power of deductive and inductive arguments.
Poetic Impacts
Finally, we should ask whether there are ulterior reasons for the persuasiveness and
emotional impact of poetic language? In fact I think that this may very well be the
case. Listen to the following:
TRANSCRIPT OF BABY TALK
Sequence with Mother and Liam, 8 weeks
[p] Oh, what you say? You are going to tell me a story?
[pp] Tell me a story, then.
[ppp] Tell me a story. [BABY SOUND]
Really! Ah, that’sagood story!
That was a good story, tell me more.
Tell me more?
Tell me more. Yes? [BABY SOUND]
Come on then.
* * * [12 lines omitted] * * *
[sf] Ohhhh, [mf] big yawns!
Big yawns!
[p] Oh your ear’s all squashed.
Your ear’s squashed.
Have you got a squashed ear? Yes.
* * * [17 lines omitted] * * *
Oh. Come on, then, tell me about it.
[sf] Ohhhh.
Ohhhh.
Lots of hiccups. [BABY SOUNDS]
Yes. [p] Lots and lots of hiccups. Um-hm. [RISING CONTOUR]
Another one!
Too much milk.
You’ve had too much milk.
You’ve had too much milk.
Yes.
Too much milk. (PAUSE)
[Softer] Too much milk.
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Oh! Oh! Oh, serious face.
What a serious face.
What a serious face.
(WHISPERS) Has he got tickly feet [acceler.]
Has he got tickly feet.
Has you got tickly feet?
Where’s your tickly feet?
Where’s your tickly feet?
Oh! You blowing bubbles?
[pp] You blowing bubbles,
With your tickly feet, oh, your tickly feet.
Sequence recorded in the laboratory of Prof. Colwyn Trevarthyn, University of
Edingburgh, U.K. Here quoted from Dissanayake 2001: 339)
This is baby talk, the way mothers worldwide
7 talk to their babies the first six
months of the infants’ life. Ellen Dissanayake, who has written an important and
excellent article on the implication for art of this phenomenon, has pointed out some
of the features of this kind of talking. It is melodic and rhythmic; it uses stanza-like
forms; repetition seems to be its master-device; it is hyperbolic; it uses elaboration,
but it also simplifies; and it is directed towards eliciting and keeping the attention of
the baby and to making it feel good.
Obviously the mother is saying something; she produces a string of meaningful
sentences. The baby, however, has no clue whatsoever what she is talking about.
However, this does not matter at all, because the baby does understand that it is the
center of attention, that the most important person in its life is acting lovingly and
with pleasure towards it. These positive feelings are communicated from mother to
infant by means of poetic\rhetorical devices, namely simplification, repetition,
exaggeration and elaboration. Dissanayake, stressing the early appearance of this
kind of communication, calls aesthetic incunabula.
Given the fact that the first kind of communication between mother and infant
makes an absolutely extensive use of rhetorical/poetic devices, it is, at least to me, no
wonder that human beings enjoy and are being positively moved by these devices,
whenever they encounter then later in life, and they encounter them all the time
throughout life. One might even speculate, with Dissanayake, whether the infant’s
sensitivity to such patterning of speech “suggests that humans are born with natural
(innate, universal) predispositions for aesthetic engagement.” (ibid. 336).
Consequently, there are, I think, compelling reasons to hold that feelings are all-
important in literature because they are present in and elicited both by what is
represented and by the way it is represented. Literature, being a part of the rhetorical
use and structuring of language, is, in fact, designed to call forth feelings. It does not
represent a general principle, but an individual, albeit most often typical, case, i.e.
the handling by individual persons (characters and narrators) of specific situations
and events, and how they emotionally respond to such challenges.
7 Of course baby talk is also determined by the specific features of the language in question, but,
nevertheless, very important features are the same independent of language structure.
Integr Psych Behav (2010) 44:185–196 195 195Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Aristotle (1926).Art of Rhetoric (trans. J.H. Reese). Cambridge MASS/London: Harvard University Press/
Heinemann: Loeb.
Bruner, J. S. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press.
Brooks, C. (1947/1968). The well-wrought urn. London: Methuen: University Paperbacks.
Dissanayake, E. (2001). Aesthetic incunabula. Philosophy and Literature, 25, 335–346.
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind. Three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition.
Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press.
Johansen, J. D. (2002). Literary discourse. A semiotic-pragmatic approach to literature (p. 489). Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Lukács, G. (1963). Ästhetik I–II (Gesammelte Werke Band 11–12). Neuwid: Luchterhand Verlag.
Perelman, Ch, & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press.
Veivo, H., Ljungberg, C., & Johansen, J. D. (Eds.). (2009). Redefining literary semiotics. Cambridge:
Cambridge Scholars.
Wimsatt, W., & Beardsley, M. (1954). The intentional fallacy. In W. K. Wimsatt (Ed.), The verbal icon:
Studies in the meaning of poetry (pp. 3–18). Town: U of Kentucky Press.
Jørgen Dines Johansen (born 1943). Ph.d. from Copenhagen University in general and comparative
literature 1970. Received the gold medal of Copenhagen University for a prize essay on Postwar Theories
of the Novelle 1969 (published 1970). Professor of general and comparative literature at University of
Southern Denmark since 1976. In 1999 he got prix mouton d’or for an article in Semiotica “A
diagrammatic modeling of semiosis.” In 2004 his book Literary Discourse. A Semiotic-Pragmatic
Approach to Literature (University of Toronto Press 2002) received the Perkins-prize from The American
Society for the Study of Narrative Literature.
196 Integr Psych Behav (2010) 44:185–196